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Abstract
Forgery and key-recovery attacks are described on the 3gpp-MAC scheme, proposed for in-
clusion in the 3gpp speci0cation. Three main classes of attack are given, all of which operate
whether or not truncation is applied to the MAC value. Attacks in the 0rst class use a large
number of ‘chosen MACs’, those in the second class use a large number of ‘known MACs’, and
those in the third class require a large number of MAC veri0cations, but very few known MACs
and no chosen MACs. The 0rst class yields both forgery and key-recovery attacks, whereas the
second and third classes are key-recovery attacks only. Both single-key and two-key variants
of 3gpp-MAC are considered; the forgery attacks are relevant to both variants, whereas the
key-recovery attacks are only relevant to the two-key variant.
? 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We are concerned here with the security of a CBC-MAC scheme proposed for
inclusion in the 3gpp speci0cation, see e.g., the home page of ETSI (the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute), www.etsi.org. Speci0cally we consider both
forgery and key-recovery attacks, which provide upper bounds on the level of security
o;ered by the scheme. We consider both the single-key version (as employed in the
3gpp speci0cations) and the more general two-key version.
The 3gpp-MAC scheme operates as follows. Suppose the underlying block cipher
has n-bit blocks and uses a key of k bits. If X is an n-bit block then we write eK (X )
for the encryption of X using key K . A message D is 0rst padded and split into a
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sequence of q n-bit blocks: D1; D2; : : : ; Dq. The MAC scheme uses a pair of keys K ,
K ′, where, for 3gpp, K ′ is derived from K by exoring K with a 0xed mask consisting
of alternate ones and zeros. The MAC computation is as follows.
H1 = eK (D1);
Hi = eK (Di ⊕ Hi−1) (26 i6 q);
and
MAC = eK′(H1 ⊕ H2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Hq):
We refer to Hi as the chaining variable. For the purposes of this paper we assume that
the padding method does not involve pre0xing the data with a length block. Note that
the MAC used will be truncated to the left-most m bits of the MAC value given in
the above equation, where m6 n.
Following the approach used in [1], we use a four-tuple [a; b; c; d] to quantify the
resources needed for an attack, where a denotes the number of o;-line block cipher
encipherments (or decipherments), b denotes the number of known data string/MAC
pairs, c denotes the number of chosen data string/MAC pairs, and d denotes the num-
ber of on-line MAC veri0cations. Note c and d are distinguished because, in some
environments, it may be easier for an attacker to obtain MAC veri0cations (i.e. to
submit a data string/MAC pair and learn whether the MAC is valid) than to obtain the
MAC for a chosen message.
In the analysis of MAC algorithms based on a block cipher with a k-bit key, it is
standard to assume that the block cipher itself is secure, and hence a key-recovery attack
will require at least 2k invocations of the block cipher. Observe that, for 3gpp-MAC,
if the two k-bit MAC keys K; K ′ are related, i.e. one is derived from the other, or
they are both derived from a single k-bit key, then a simple exhaustive search can
be performed using a very small number of known MACs. The total complexity is
[(q+ 3)2k ; (k + 1)=m; 0; 0], where q is the number of blocks in the shortest message
for which a MAC is known. That is, from the point of view of key-recovery attacks,
using a single-key version of this MAC scheme, as speci0ed in the 3gpp documents, is
not signi0cantly better than the simplest of CBC-MAC schemes (e.g. those in [1]). The
main purpose of 3gpp-MAC would therefore appear to be to achieve greater resistance
to forgery attacks than the standardised CBC-MAC schemes, at minimal additional
cost.
In the 0rst part of Section 2 we exhibit a series of forgery attacks against 3gpp-MAC
which show that the level of security obtained by this scheme is not as high as one
might expect from an iterative MAC scheme employing a 2n-bit internal chaining
variable. Nevertheless, the complexity compares well with the attack complexities for
comparable standardised schemes from [1]. This analysis makes no assumptions about
the keys, i.e. the keys are treated as being independent of one another. That is, the
analysis applies regardless of whether the keys are chosen independently or one is
derived from the other, as in 3gpp.
It is therefore arguable that the 3gpp-MAC scheme is a candidate for wider adoption
as a CBC-MAC technique. This means that an analysis of the resistance of the two-key
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variant to key-recovery attacks is also of interest, especially if the scheme is to be used
with a block cipher such as DES with a relatively small key space. Thus, in the second
part of Section 2 and in the remainder of the paper, we consider a variety of key-
recovery attacks against 3gpp-MAC in the two-key case. In the concluding section we
tabulate the security of 3gpp-MAC against various types of attack; when considering
3gpp-MAC as a possible CBC-MAC technique for general applications, these tables
should be compared with the comparable tables given in [1] for standardised CBC-MAC
techniques.
2. Attacks using chosen MACs
Since the internal memory of 3gpp-MAC is 2n one might expect that a collision
attack will require 2n operations. But, as we will show, this is not the case. We
0rst consider a chosen-text scenario, where we give two forgery attacks and then a
key-recovery attack derived from them.
Following [4], most of the attacks are based on 0nding collisions, i.e. two messages
with the same MAC. We also refer to internal collisions, where this describes two
messages with both the same MAC and the same 0nal chaining variable, and external
collisions, i.e. collisions that are not internal collisions.
2.1. A forgery attack
We distinguish between the cases where m= n and m¡n.
The case m = n. Collect 2(n+1)=2 messages of q blocks, where q¿ 2, and get the
corresponding MAC values. (If the attacker has full control over q, he chooses q=2.)
One expects to 0nd a single collision, that is, two di;erent messages with the same
MAC value; denote these by D=D1; : : : ; Dq and D′=D′1; : : : ; D
′
q. These messages collide
in n of the 2n bits of internal memory. In the next step a collision is found also in
the other n bits.
Choose 2n=2 messages of the form D(i) = D1; : : : ; Dq; E(i) and 2n=2 messages of
the form D′(j) = D′1; : : : ; D
′
q; E
′(j), where E(i) and E′(j) are randomly chosen n-bit
blocks, and get the corresponding MAC values. One expects to 0nd a single internal
collision, say D(i) and D′(j). De0ne = E(i)⊕ E′(j).
Thus for any n-bit block Z the messages D1; : : : ; Dq; Z and D′1; : : : ; D
′
q; Z ⊕  will
have the same MAC value. Therefore, one can forge the MAC of D′1; : : : ; D
′
q; Z ⊕ 
by observing or requesting the MAC of D1; : : : ; Dq; Z . The complexity of this attack
is [0; 2(n+1)=2; 2n=2+1; 0].
The case m¡n; Attack 1. A 0rst attack is a simple extension of the above attack,
and applies when m¿n=2. Collect 2(n+1)=2 messages and their corresponding MACs.
One can expect to 0nd 2n−m pairs of messages with matching MACs, one of which
will collide also in the n − m discarded bits [3]. For each of these pairs, D and D′
say, choose 2n=2 messages of the form D(i) = D; E(i) and 2n=2 messages of the form
D′(j) = D′; E′(j), where E(i) and E′(j) are randomly chosen n-bit blocks, and get
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the corresponding MAC values. From [3], one expects to 0nd 2n−m pairs of messages
D(i) and D′(j) with matching MACs.
De0ne i;j=E(i)⊕E′(j). It remains to test whether i;j can be used to forge MACs
as in the case for m= n. Simply get the MACs of the messages D; Z and D′; Z ⊕ i;j
for some value of Z , and check whether the MACs are equal. In almost all cases, one
such test will suKce to distinguish external collisions and internal collisions. Thus,
this attack requires 2n−m(2n=2+1 + 2n−m) chosen messages, which for m¿n=2 is ap-
proximately 2n−m2n=2+1=23n=2−m+1. The complexity of this attack is [0; 0; 23n=2−m+1; 0],
when m¿n=2 (note that we ignore the 2(n+1)=2 MACs required in the 0rst stage, since
this number is dominated by 23n=2−m+1).
The case m¡n; Attack 2. A second attack is the following. The attacker 0rst
collects 2(m+n)=2 messages and their MAC values. Divide the 2(m+n)=2 known MACs
into 2m classes according to the value of the truncated MAC. It follows that at least
one class will contain 2(n−m)=2 messages or more, all with the same MAC value. Two
of these messages are expected to also collide in the discarded n−m bits. Suppose the
messages are (E1; E2; : : : ; Eq) and (F1; F2; : : : ; Fr) and that the internal part MACs for
these two messages are Hq and H ′r .
For every message (D1; D2; : : : ; Ds) in the class, get the MAC on message (D1; D2; : : : ;
Ds; X ) for 2n=2 di;erent randomly chosen values of X . This is a total of 2n=22(n−m)=2 =
2n−m=2 chosen MACs. By the usual birthday arguments, there is a good chance that
MACs will have been computed for messages (E1; E2; : : : ; Eq; X ) and (F1; F2; : : : ; Fr; Y )
where Hq ⊕ X = H ′r ⊕ Y .
That is, somewhere amongst the set of 2n−m=2 chosen MACs is an internal collision.
The problem remains of 0nding the internal collision from amongst the many other
collisions, where the expected total number of messages involved in an ‘external col-
lision’ is bounded above by 22n−2m. Note that once we have the internal collision, we
can use it to forge MACs in much the same vein as in the case m= n.
If m is large relative to n (say m¿ 2n=3), then this is relatively straightforward to
achieve, since 22n−2m will be small relative to the total number of messages (2n−m=2).
For every message M which gives rise to a collision, obtain a further chosen MAC
for the message M;C, where C is a 0xed n-bit block. The number of additional MACs
required will be less than 2n−m=2, since we only consider those messages which give
rise to a collision. Hence we can ignore this number in assessing the attack complexity,
since it is dominated by 2n−m=2. Hence, for this simple case, the total complexity of
the attack is [0; 2(m+n)=2; 2n−m=2; 0].
However, if m is smaller relative to n, say m6 2n=3, then the attack is a little
more complex. In such a case, most of the messages (D1; D2; : : : ; Ds; X ) are involved
in an external collision, and so the simple strategy will not work. Instead, we obtain
further chosen MACs for every message (to avoid unnecessary sorting). The number
of additional MACs, h, is set to
h= (2n− 2m)=m:
That is, for every (D1; D2; : : : ; Ds; X ), we obtain a set of h further chosen MACs
for the messages (D1; D2; : : : ; Ds; X; Ci), where C1; C2; : : : ; Ch are a 0xed set of n-bit
blocks. That is we compute a total of (h+ 1)2n−m=2 chosen MACs. We thus associate
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with each choice for (D1; D2; : : : ; Ds; X ) an (h + 1)-tuple of MACs. It is simple to
see that if (D1; D2; : : : ; Ds; X ) and (D′1; D
′
2; : : : ; D
′
s′ ; X
′) are two such choices which
give rise to an internal collision, then all of the MACs in the respective (h+1)-tuples
will match. The value of h is chosen so that there is a very good chance that only the
internal collision will give rise to a match (any additional matches can in any case be
eliminated using a small additional number of chosen MACs, which will not a;ect the
overall complexity estimate).
For this more complex case, the total complexity of the attack is therefore equal to
[0; 2(m+n)=2; ((2n− 2m)=m+1)2n−m=2; 0]. It follows that the number of known MACs
increases and the number of chosen MACs decreases for increasing values of m.
In summary, if m¿ 2n=3 the 0rst attack is faster, if m¡ 2n=3 the second attack
is faster, and the complexities of the two attacks are similar if m = 2n=3. Note that
these complexities compare favourably with the forgery attack complexities for most
of the standardised CBC-MAC techniques, as detailed in an annex to [1]. That is, this
technique might merit consideration for adoption in any future revision to the standard.
2.2. A key-recovery attack
The internal collisions of the previous section can also be used in key-recovery
attacks. Take the pair of messages giving the internal collision from the forgery attack.
For all values of the key K , compute the MACs of the two messages and check for
collisions in the 2n bits. For a wrong value of the key each of these collision checks
will succeed with probability 2−2n. If more than one-key candidate passes this test, it
is repeated for chosen MACs on messages constructed by adding a 0xed block to the
end of the two messages in the internal collision. Once K is known, K ′ can be found
by exhaustive search.
The attack requires approximately 2k+1q operations, where q is the average length of
the messages involved. In a chosen plaintext attack the attacker chooses q=2 in which
case the complexity is that of the forgery attack plus 2k+2 block cipher operations.
3. Key-recovery attacks using known MACs
3.1. The ‘basic’ Preneel-van Oorschot attack
If m= n then the attack of [4] applies with complexity [s× 2k ; 2n=2; 0; 0], where s is
a small positive integer approximately equal to 2q, and q is the average block-length
of the messages for which the MAC is known.
BrieMy, when applied to this MAC scheme, the Preneel-van Oorschot attack is as
follows. Consider arbitrary (padded) messages D1; D2; : : : ; Dq and E1; E2; : : : ; Er . Also
let
H1 = eK (D1);
Hi = eK (Di ⊕ Hi−1) (26 i6 q);
H ′1 = eK (E1)
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and
H ′i = eK (Ei ⊕ H ′i−1) (26 i6 r):
The messages will give the same MAC if and only if ⊕qi=1 Hi = ⊕ri=1 H ′i . Hence, a
collision gives a means to eliminate candidates for K independently of the value of
K ′, i.e. a collision can be used as the basis of an exhaustive search for K . A separate
exhaustive search can be used to 0nd K ′. Finding the desired collision will require
around 2n=2 known MACs, and the subsequent exhaustive search will require q + r
encryptions for each candidate key (where q and r are the numbers of blocks in the
colliding messages). The attack complexity given above thus follows.
Unfortunately, if m is signi0cantly less than n, then this attack becomes much more
complex, since it becomes diKcult to distinguish full n-bit collisions from m-bit ones.
That is, there will be many external collisions that need to be eliminated in order to
0nd the desired internal collision. Very approximately, max{2n=2; 2n−m} of the set of
2n=2 messages will be involved in one or more internal collisions. Hence, when the
exhaustive search is performed, the number of encryption operations necessary will
grow to very approximately 2k+n−mq if m¿n=2 and 2k+n=2q if m6 n=2, where q is
the average block-length of the messages. (Note that extra collisions and searches will
be required to eliminate the remaining key candidates if m6 k, although the numbers
of calculations involved will not a;ect the overall complexity.)
This is potentially a very large number of encryption operations. As a result, in
the next section we consider a generalised version of the Preneel-van Oorschot attack
which reduces the number of encryption operations at the cost of increasing the number
of known MACs required.
3.2. A generalised Preneel-van Oorschot attack
The generalised attack operates in a series of three stages.
Stage 1: Processing the known MACs. Suppose the attacker has 2(n+m)=2 known
MACs. The attacker divides these messages into 2m classes according to the value of
the MAC. Each class will contain approximately 2(n−m)=2 messages, all with the same
MAC value, i.e. for which the 0rst m bits of the ‘untruncated MAC’ are equal. Since
there are 2n−m possibilities for the n−m bits discarded during MAC truncation, there
is a good chance that, within any class, there is at least one pair of messages whose
‘untruncated MACs’ agree. To maximise this probability, we work with the classes
containing the most messages.
Stage 2: Exhaustive search to ;nd K . Choose the k=m largest classes of messages
(as constructed in Stage 1). For each such class perform an exhaustive search as
follows.
For every key compute the value ⊕qi=1 Hi for each message in the class (where Hi is
de0ned as above, and q is the number of blocks in the padded message). This involves
approximately 2k2(n−m)=2q encryption operations, where q is the average block-length
of the messages. The values resulting are then examined to see if there is a collision.
For the correct key K there is a good chance that there will be a collision, whereas
for a randomly selected key the probability of a collision is equal to the probability
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that a randomly chosen set of 2(n−m)=2 n-bit values will contain two identical values.
This is very approximately 2−m (see [3]).
After this search has been performed for each of the message classes, each key
will have an associated ‘count’, indicating the number of message classes for which
a collision was found. A simple probabilistic analysis reveals that the key with the
greatest count is likely to be the ‘correct’ value of K .
Note that the 0rst exhaustive search (using the largest class) could be used to elim-
inate all but a small fraction of keys, by only proceeding with those keys for which
a collision is found. This reduces the complexity of subsequent searches dramatically,
meaning that the overall cost of this stage is reduced to approximately 2k+(n−m)=2q
encryption operations. The downside of such an approach is that it would increase the
risk that the correct key is missed. In the complexity analysis we assume that such an
approach is used.
Stage 3: Exhaustive search to ;nd K ′. The 0nal stage is the simplest. Armed with
the correct value of K , a set of any (k + 1)=m messages with known MACs can be
used as the basis of an exhaustive search to 0nd K ′.
3.3. An analysis of the generalised attack
We start by considering the complexity of the attack. The costs of Stages 1–3
are 2(n+m)=2 known MACs, 2k+(n−m)=2q encryptions, and 2kq encryptions, respectively.
This means that the total attack complexity is approximately [2k+(n−m)=2q; 2(n+m)=2; 0; 0].
Thus, by comparison with the ‘basic’ Preneel-van Oorschot attack, and assuming that
m6 n=2, the number of known MACs has increased from 2n=2 to 2(n+m)=2, whereas the
number of o;-line encryptions has decreased from 2k+n=2q to 2k+(n−m)=2q.
Finally, note that, if less than 2(n+m)=2 known MACs are available, then the attack
still works. However, more classes of messages will need to be examined, i.e. there is
a trade o; between decreasing the number of known MACs and increasing the number
of o;-line encryption operations. In the limit, if only 2n=2 known MACs are available,
all classes containing more than one message will need to be examined, and the attack
becomes identical to the Preneel-van Oorschot attack discussed in the previous section.
This justi0es the use of the term ‘generalised’ in the name of the attack.
4. A key-recovery attack using MAC verications
We now consider a di;erent type of key-recovery attack, analogous to the Knudsen–
Preneel attack [2]. Instead of using a large number of known MACs, these attacks
require only one (or at most a very small number of) known MAC(s) combined with
a large number of MAC veri0cations.
4.1. The case m= n
First suppose m = n, i.e. there is no truncation, and suppose also that k ¡n. Now
suppose the attacker knows the MAC for some message, i.e. the attacker knows that
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MAC(D1; D2; : : : ; Dq) = M for some (padded) sequence of message blocks
D1; D2; : : : ; Dq.
The attacker now assembles the set of all 2n (q+ 1)-block padded messages of the
form X;D1; D2; : : : ; Dq, where X ranges over all possible n-bit blocks, and for each 0nds
out whether or not the valid MAC is M (thus requiring 2n ‘MAC veri0cations’). This
will be true for the unique case where eK (X ) = 0 (the all-zero n-bit block), and also
‘by chance’ for approximately one value of X . Thus, if a unique value of X results
from this test then the attacker can be sure that this is the desired value, i.e. the one
for which eK (X ) = 0. If more than one value of X ‘passes’ the test, then a second
known MAC can be used to eliminate the remaining false candidates by repeating the
above test but with only the remaining candidate values of X .
Armed with the desired equation eK (X )=0, the attacker can do an exhaustive search
for K , which will probably only yield the correct value of K since we assumed that
k ¡n. Finally, once K is known, the known MAC can be used as the basis of an
exhaustive search for K ′, which will again probably only yield the correct value of K ′
since k ¡n.
If the attacker is lucky, and only one known MAC is needed to 0nd the desired X ,
the total complexity of the above attack is [2k+1; 1; 0; 2n], since the exhaustive searches
for K and K ′ will require 2k encryptions each. If the attacker is unlucky and requires
a second known MAC in the initial part of the attack then the complexity will increase
to at most [2k+1; 2; 0; 2n].
We deal with the case k¿ n as part of the analysis of the case m6 n.
4.2. The case m6 n
If the MAC is truncated, i.e. if m6 n, then a very similar attack approach will work,
although a small number of additional known MACs are needed.
The case k ¡n. In this case the attacker starts the attack exactly as in the m = n
case, although, after the initial set of 2n MAC veri0cations, a total of approximately
2n−m + 1 candidates for X will remain. The MAC veri0cation step can be repeated
with a second known MAC (and the set of remaining candidates for X ), after which
approximately 2n−2m+1 candidates will remain. The process can be repeated as many
times as necessary until a single candidate for X satisfying eK (X ) = 0 remains.
Thus, given a set of around (n+1)=m known MACs, the required block X satisfying
eK (X ) = 0 can be found. The total number of MAC veri0cations required will be
approximately 2n + 2n−m + 2n−2m + · · ·, which is approximately the same as 2n (given
that, in practice, m will always be at least 8).
The exhaustive search for K will be exactly as in the previous case, and the search
for K ′ may require use of up to (k + 1)=m known MACs (which can be the same
as those used in the 0rst stage of the attack). Again as previously, the search for K
will probably yield a unique result because we assumed that k ¡n.
Given that we assumed that k ¡n, and hence (k + 1)=m¡ (n + 1)=m, the total
complexity of the attack will thus be approximately [2k+1; (n+ 1)=m; 0; 2n].
The case k¿ n. In this case the attacker proceeds as when k ¡n, and we suppose
that, given around (n+1)=m known MACs, the required block X satisfying eK (X )=0
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can be found. The total number of MAC veri0cations required will be approximately
2n. The complexity of this 0rst part of the attack will therefore be approximately
[0; (n+ 1)=m; 0; 2n].
However, the next stage is a little more complex in that, when the exhaustive search
for K is performed using the equation eK (x)=0, approximately 2k−n+1 candidates for
the key K will remain. It will thus be necessary to obtain further equations involving
K to eliminate all but the correct candidate for K . Such equations can be obtained as
follows. Suppose the attacker knows that MAC(D1; D2; : : : ; Dq)=M for some (padded)
sequence of message blocks D1; D2; : : : ; Dq. (This can be the same as one of the ‘known
MACs’ previously used.) The attacker now assembles the set of all 2n (q + 1)-block
padded messages of the form D1; D2; : : : ; Dq; Y , where Y ranges over all possible n-bit
blocks, and for each 0nds out whether or not the valid MAC is M (thus requiring
2n ‘MAC veri0cations’). This will be true for the unique case where Hq ⊕ Y = X ,
where Hq is the chaining variable as de0ned in Section 1, and also ‘by chance’ for
approximately 2n−m values of X . We will thus obtain a set of approximately 2n−m+1
candidate values Z for the solution to the equation Hq = Z .
This set of candidate values of Z can be used to eliminate a large fraction of the
remaining candidates for K , i.e. after performing one such search we would expect
the number of candidate values for K to be reduced from approximately 2k−n + 1 to
approximately 2k−n−m + 1. The above procedure can be repeated as many times as
necessary until just one candidate value for K remains; the number of iterations will
be approximately (k − n+ 1)=m. Each iteration will require use of a single ‘known
MAC’, 2n MAC veri0cations, and q2x block cipher encryptions, where q is the length
of the ‘known MAC’ message and 2x is the number of candidate keys remaining at
this stage of the attack. Note that it is reasonable to assume that q2x will be orders of
magnitude smaller than 2k , and hence we ignore the cost of these calculations.
Hence the total complexity of this stage of the attack will be
[2k ; (k − n+ 1)=m; 0; (k − n+ 1)=m2n];
where the set of (k − n + 1)=m known MACs can overlap with the set of known
MACs used in the search for X .
Finally, as when k ¡n, the exhaustive search for K ′ will require use of approxi-
mately (k + 1)=m known MACs, i.e. the complexity of this last part of the attack
will therefore be approximately [2k ; (k + 1)=m; 0; 0].
Thus the total attack complexity will be approximately
[2k+1; (max(k; n) + 1)=m; 0; (k − n+ m+ 1)=m2n]:
4.3. Applying the attack to other MAC schemes
It should be clear that the above attacks (for m¡n) will also work in almost exactly
the same way against any of MAC Algorithms 1, 2 or 3 from ISO/IEC 9797-1 [1], with
the exception that the ‘extra iterations’ needed to deal with the case k¿ n will need
to be modi0ed slightly, since for these schemes we know that MAC(D1; D2; : : : ; Dq) =
MAC(D1; D2; : : : ; Dq; Y ) when eK (Hq ⊕ Y ) = Hq (as opposed to Hq ⊕ Y = X ).
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Table 1
Key-recovery attack complexities
a b c d Condition Section
2k+2 2(n+1)=2 2n=2+1 0 m= n 2
2k+2 0 23n=2−m+1 0 n=2¡m¡n 2
2k+2 2(n+m)=2 ((2n− 2m)=m+ 1)2n−m=2 0 m¡n 2
2k+(n−m)=2q 2(n+m)=2 0 0 3
2k+1 1 0 2n m= n; k ¡n 4
2k+1 (n+ 1)=m 0 2n k ¡n 4
2k+1 (k + 1)=m 0 2n k¿ n 4
Table 2
Forgery attack complexities
a b c d Condition Section
0 2(n+1)=2 2n=2+1 0 m= n 2
0 0 23n=2−m+1 0 n=2¡m¡n 2
0 2(n+m)=2 ((2n− 2m)=m+ 1)2n−m=2 0 m¡n 2
Of course, for these algorithms the attack of Knudsen and Preneel [2], also applies,
and the two attacks have very similar complexities. The main di;erence is that the
Knudsen–Preneel attack requires 2k MAC veri0cations, whereas the attack described
here requires (k−n+m+1)=m2n MAC veri0cations. Hence, if k6 n, the new attack
is somewhat less eKcient, although if k ¿n + 1 the new attack requires less MAC
veri0cations.
5. Conclusions
We have described three di;erent types of key-recovery attack on the 3gpp-MAC
scheme. In doing so we have also described methods for forging 3gpp-MACs. Ta-
ble 1 summarises the complexities of the various key-recovery attacks, and Table 2
summarises the complexities of the forgery attacks. In both tables k and n denote the
size of the key and the block, respectively, of the underlying block cipher, m denotes
the number of bits in the MAC, a; b; c, and d denote resources required for the attack
(as in Section 1), and q denotes the number of blocks in the known messages of the
particular attack.
Our results show that in the case where the MACs are not truncated the complexities
of key-recovery attacks and forgery attacks are comparable to those of the standard
CBC-MAC. Thus in this case the extra e;ort in the computation of 3gpp-MACs does
not pay o; in terms of increased security.
Finally, note that for the 3gpp application we have k=128, n=64 and m=32, which
makes the key-recovery attacks infeasible, and also means that the most eKcient forgery
L.R. Knudsen, C.J. Mitchell / Discrete Applied Mathematics 128 (2003) 181–191 191
attack requires around 3× 248 chosen messages. This is unlikely to pose a problem in
practice.
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